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CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF PHYSICIANS FOR
STERILIZATION OPERATIONS
By JUSTIN MILLER and GORDON

DEAN

(From the March issue of the American Bar Association Journal).
In California, between 1910 and
1929, six thousand and fifty-five sterilization operations have been performed in public institutions.
About three thousand such operations have been performed in other
States during the same period.
How many operations have been
privately performed, it is impossible
to state.
"The operations most frequently
used for this purpose are that of
vasectomy as applied to males and
salpingectomy as applied to females.
We are assured by members of the
medical profession who have developed these techniques that, unlike castration and spaying, vasectomy and
salpingectomy do not desexualize the
individual or produce other physical
or mental changes except such as
may grow out of a realization that
function had
the child-producing
been destroyed. The constitutionality of statutes providing for the
sterilization of the unfit has been
established in a number of states and
by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The courts have been more
reluctant about conceding the constitutionality of statutes providing
for the sterilization of criminals."
(For a full discussion of the law involved in the preceding introductory
see, "The Law and
paragraphs
Human Sterilization" by Otis H.
Castle, 53 Reports of Am. Bar. Assn.
556).
"In most of the statutes which
provide for the sterilization of the
unfit in state institutions, there have
been incorporated provisions, absolving from civil and criminal liability,
those who perform such operations.

As yet, none of these provisions have
been passed upon by courts of review. Presumably, in order to avoid
liability, the provisions of the statutes must be strictly complied with."
"Ordinarily the purpose is therapeutic (A distinction between eugenical and therapeutic purposes is important under some of the sterilization statutes; Indiana Stats. 1927,
Ch. 241, Sec. 6; Utah Stats. 1925,
Ch. 82, Sec. 6; Mississippi Stats.
1928, Ch. 294, Sec. 6; Virginia Ann.
Code 1924, Ch. 46b, Sec. 1095m, (P.
569). 'Medical' and 'therapeutic' are
probably synonymous. See Williams
v. Scudder, 102 Ohio State 305, 131
N. E. 481, 483; Gould Med. Dict. (2d
ed) p. 1380.), rather then eugenic,
nevertheless there are cases of voluntary private sterilizations where
the purpose is to cut off a strain of
defective germ-plasm, as in the case
of a diagnosis of hereditary insanity
or in case of the marriage of two
persons each with a pronounced family history of cancer. We may safely assume, no doubt, that in some
cases the purpose of the operation
is merely to remove danger of pregnancy."
"An operation for sterilization
would clearly result in criminal liability in many cases. Death resulting from such a cause, if no justification or excuse were present, would
make the perpetrator guilty of a
homicide, varying in degree according to the malice and intent in his
mind at the time of the act."
"The usual considerations in defor
homicide
liability
termining
would be pertinent here. Gross negligence, general criminal intent, the
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fact of being engaged in the cornmission of another felony, might
each be sufficient to supply the element of intent. (Gross Negligence.
See note 61 L.R.A. 287, 289.
See
also State v. Reynolds, 42 Kan. 320,
22 Pac. 410, 16 Am. St. Rep. 483
(1889) and note; State v. Hardister,
38 Ark. 605, 42 Am. Rep. 5 (1882).
General Criminal Intent. Clark and
Marshall Crimes (3d ed) Sec. 243;
State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 95 Am.
Dec. 776 (1868); State v. Lodge, 9
Houst (Del) 542, 33 Atl. 312 (1892).
Homicide in Commission of Felony.
I Hale P. C. 473; 21 Mich. L. Rev.
95. See Clark and Marshall Crimes
(3d ed) 195, and cases collected in
63 L. R. A. 353. At present, Utah is
the only state which makes an unlawful sterilization operation a felony; Utah Laws of 1925, Chap. 82,
Sec. 7. In two states unlawful sterilization operations are misdemeanors; Iowa Stats. 1924. Code of Iowa
1927, Ch. 168 Sec. 3364. When originally passed in 1915 the section was
2600s (5). Kansas Stats. 1917, Chap.
299, Sec. 7. Revised Stats. 1923, Chap.
76, Sec. 177.) The main consideration would be that of causation, and
death resulting.
"In similar manner such an operation might result in liability for
mayhem or maiming. This would be
clearly true in case of castration because the effect of the operation is to
change the entire physical character
of the individual. (Castration: Bouvier Law Dict. 1 Hawk P. C. 107;
Bishop Crim. Law. (9th ed.) Sec.
1001.)"
"In cases both of homicide and
mayhem, even the consent of the
person castrated would not 'serve to
excuse the physician, for it is clearly established that consent of the injured person in this type of case does
not operate to prevent criminal liability. (See People v. Clough, 17
Wendell 351, 31 Am. Dec. 303 (1837)

for a full discussion, and Rex. v.
Wright, 1 East P. C. 396, Co. Lltt.
127a. In abortion cases where death
results, the homicide is not justifiable.
State v. Magnell, 3 Penn.
(Del) 307, 51 Al. 606 (1901); State
v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 95 Am. Dec.
776 (1868). The same is true where
death is the result of a duel. Regina v. Barronet, Dears C. C. 51.)"
"An interesting subject of inquiry
is opened up when we attempt to
apply these principles of law to the
modern sterilization operations of
vasectomy and salpingectomy. As
has been pointed out already they
are entirely different from the cruel
and despoiling operations known to
the common law. It is true that in
at least one recent case the use of
the modern operations was condemned as constituting cruel and unusual
punishment.
(Hendricks v. Mickle,
262 Fed. 677, D. C. D. Nev. 1918;
Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413, D. C. S.
D. Iowa 1914. See also dissenting
opinion in Smith v. Command 231
Mich. 409, 204 N. W. 140, 142
(1925).)"
"In recent years a few of the states
which have
adopted
sterilization
statutes have incorporated therein
two types of prohibitory provisions
with regard to the performance ol
non-therapeutic private operations
of sterilization.
"First, the statutes of Indiana,
(Indiana Stats. 1927, Ch. 241, Sec.
6), Utah (Utah Stats. 1925, Ch. 82,
Sec.
6)
Mississippi
(Mississippi
Stats. 1928, Ch. 294, Sec. 6) and Virginia (Virginia Ann. Code 1924, Ch.
46b, Sec. 1095m, (p. 569.), make the
following provision for therapeutt
operations of sterilization:
'Nothing in this act shall be construed so as to prevent the medical
or surgical treatment for sound therapeutic reasons of any person in
this state, by a physician or surgeon
licensed in this state which treat-

THE MEDICO-LEGAL JOURNAL
ment may incidentally involve the
nullification or destruction of the reproductive functions.'
"The Indiana statute makes a further qualification,
'provided that
such treatment shall be that which
is recognized as legal and approved
after due process of law.'
"It will be noted that this type of
provision does not make such operation a criminal offense, and no punishment is provided. It is probably
at most a provision designed to
avoid civil liability except where the
operation is non-therapeutic, or possibly even where the physician is unlicensed, or the operation 'primarily'
(as distinguished from 'incidentally')
involves the nullification or destruction of the reproductive functions.
If the operation did contain any of
the above impliedly prohibited circumstances, an attorney might well
hesitate to advise a physician that
he might safely perform the operation in a state which had such a
statute. Especially would this be
true in Indiana. (Indiana is one of
the states in which consent to an abortion is not a bar to civil recovery
against the physician by the patient.
Martin v. Hardesty, 163 N. W. 610,
(Ind. 1928), but see Courtney v.
Clinton 18 Ind. App. 620, 48 N. E.
799 (1897).
"Second, in three states, Iowa
(Iowa Stats. 1924. Code of Iowa
1927. Ch. 168. Sec. 3364. When originally passed in 1915 the section
was 2600s (5),
Kansas, (Kansas
Stats. 1917, Chap. 299, Sec. 7. Revised Stats. 1923, Chap. 76, Sec. 177),
and Utah, (Utah Laws of 1925,
Chap. 82, Sec. 7.) a direct penal provision is found:
'Except as authorized by this act'
(the act refers to the sterilization of
the unfit
in state institutions,)
'every person who shall perform, encourage, assist in, or otherwise promote the performance of either of

the operations'
(vasectomy
a nd
salpingectomy) 'for the purpose of
destroying the powers of procreation, unless performance of such
operation is a medical necessity,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.'
"Utah is the only state which incorporates in its acts both of the
above provisions."
"In those states which have penal
provisions regulating liability for
performance of s u c h operations
without therapeutic or medical justification,
liability
is
determined
thereby. Where the state has nothing but a mayhem statute which follows the common law concept, it is
very doubtful if the modern operations for sterilization
could
be
classed as criminal. Where the
statute speaks in terms of 'rendering
useless' a member or organ of a
human being, there is possibility of a
decision either denying or establishing liability. In any event malice
seems to be an element essential to
criminal liability in such a case."
As to civil liability the authors differentiate between cases where the
plaintiff has consented to the operation and those where the operation
has been performed without or
against the plaintiff's consent.
They state that although some
cases are on record involving operations which incidentally resulted in
sterility, no case has been found in
which a person who has consented to
a sterilization operation has brought
suit against a physician.
The authors draw an analogy between illegal sterilization operations
and illegal abortions.
"Appellate courts of this country
have considered nine cases of abortions where suit was brought by or
for one who had consented to the
operation. In four of the jurisdictions, Federal, (Hunter v. Wheate,
289 Fed. 604 (C. A. D. C. 1923),
Kentucky, (Goldnamer v. O'Brien 98
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Ky. 569, 36 L. R. A. 715, 33 S. W.
831, 56 Am. St. Rep. 378 (1896). This
case is approved in Bigelow on
Torts, p. 41), Massachusetts, (Waclaw Scadificz v. Cantor, 154 N. E.
251 (Mass. 1926), and New York.
(Larocque v. Conheim, 42 Misc. 613,
87 N. Y. S. 625 (1904), no recovery
was allowed, on the principle that an
illegal transaction cannot be made
the basis of an action by one who is
a party thereto. In five of the jurisdictions, Alabama, (Hancock v. Hullett, 203 Ala. 272, 82 So. 552 (1919),
Indiana, (Martin v. Hardesty, 163 N.
W. 610, (Ind. 1928), but see Courtney v. Clinton 18 Ind. App. 620, 48
N. E. 799 (1897), Maine, (Lembo v.
Donnell, 116 Me. 505, 101 Atl. 469
(1917), Ohio, (Milliken v. Heddesheimer, 144 N. E. 264. (Ohio, 1926).
and Wisconsin, (Miller v. Bayer, 94
Wis. 123, 68 N. W. 869 (1896) recovery was allowed on the theory that
'because of the state's interest,
neither party has a right to make
any agreement to sacrifice his life
or suffer injury to his person, and
any such agreement is void.'
"In those states in which there is
no penal provision prohibiting a
sterilization operation by the modern methods, the general rule of tort
law would seem to apply and the
consent of the party to submit to the
operation should be a
complete
shield against civil liability on the
part of the operating physician, provided the operation was performed
without negligence."
If a physician performs an operation different from the one consented to, plaintiff can recover
(Cuthriel v. Protestant Hospital, an

unreported Ohio case, cited in the
notes to Kinkaid on Torts, Sec. 375).
Where an operation is performed
upon a person without the patient's
consent, express or implied, it is unlawful (Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn.
261, 104. N. W. 12, 111 Am. St. Rep.
462, 1 L. R. A. (NS) 439 (1905) and
note. See also note 26 A. L. R. 1036;
2 Cal. L. Rev. 312; and Rolater v.
Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 Pac. 196,
(1914).
If the person operated upon is incapable of giving legal consent, the
physician is of course liable.
It has been held that if the wife
gives consent, the husband's consent is either not necessary or is implied.
Where a sterilization operation is
performed on a minor without the
consent of the parent, except the
factual situation presents a clear
case of emergency (Moss v. Rishworth 191 S. W. 843 (Tex. 1917), affirmed 222 S. W. 225 (1920).
See
Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568,
111 S. E. 492 (1922) Luka v. Lowrie,
170 Mich. 122, 136 N. W. 1106, 41
L. R. A. (NS) 290 (1912) at 135),
the physician is liable.
Where before marriage, a wife is
sterilized by a private operation and
does not disclose the fact to her
husband before marriage, annulment
should be granted on the ground of
fraud, (Turner v. Avery, 92 N. J. Eq.
473, 113 Atl. 710 (1921).
The article contains quite a number of case references not mentioned in this excerpt and the reader is
referred to the original article for
further material on the question.

